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Abstract. According to Bratman, future-directed intentions are high-
level plans. We view such plans as high-level actions that can typically
not be executed directly: they have to be progressively refined until exe-
cutable basic actions are obtained. Higher- and lower-level actions are
linked by the means-end relation, alias instrumentality relation. In this
paper we extend Shoham’s database perspective of Bratman’s theory by
the notions of refinement and instrumentality.
1 Introduction
Bratman highlighted the fundamental role of an agent’s future-directed inten-
tions: they are high-level plans to which the agent is committed [3,5]. Such
high-level plans cannot be executed directly: they have to be refined as time
goes by, resulting in more and more elaborate plans. The lower-level intentions
that are inserted are instrumental for the high-level intention they refine [4]. At
the end of the refinement process plans only have in basic actions: actions the
agent can perform intentionally. Bratman’s theory is at the basis of the by now
huge literature on Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) agents. However and as more
extensively discussed in [12], the literature only contains few BDI logics where
refinement is a central ingredient: essentially [2,14,17]. It is notably absent from
Cohen and Levesque’s logic [6] and Shoham’s database perspective [15,18,19].
The latter is a simple account that is based on databases of time-indexed basic
actions and beliefs. We believe it to be a promising basis for a logical analysis
of intentions.
In order to extend Shoham’s approach by an account of intention refinement,
the first thing to do is to add high-level, temporally extended actions. We are
also going to tackle another of its shortcomings, viz. that it does not solve the
frame problem: the beliefs at time point t together with the intention at t fail
to determine the beliefs at t+1. The reason is that Shoham’s databases do not
account for environment actions, alias events. We here add them to the picture.
Just as in PDDL+ planning [10], we suppose that while the planning agent is
roactive, the environment is reactive (or, more precisely, the planning agent
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believes so). Indeed, without such reactive events we would not be able to refine
intentions. For example, consider the refinement of my intention to submit a
paper to JELIA, which involves clicking Easychair’s ‘upload’ button: I have to
believe that my click action triggers the upload event in order to believe that
clicking is a means for submitting. It is within this framework of high-level actions
and reactive events we then study relations of refinement and instrumentality
between intentions.
2 Belief-Intention Databases
Let Act = {α, β, . . .} be a finite set of actions. It contains a set of basic actions
Act0 = {a, b, . . .}: actions that can be directly executed by the planning agent.
Let Evt0 = {e, f, . . .} be a finite set of basic events. Basic events and basic
actions take one time unit to be executed. Let P = {p, q, . . .} be a finite set
of propositional variables. The language of boolean formulas built from P is
noted LP.
Definition 1. A dynamic theory is a tuple T = 〈pre, post〉 with pre, post : Act∪
Evt0 −→ LP, such that that the postconditions of basic actions and events are
conjunctions of literals: there are functions eff +, eff − : Act0 ∪ Evt0 −→ 2
P such
that for every x ∈ Act0 ∪ Evt0, post(x) =
( ∧
p∈eff+(x) p
)
∧
(∧
p∈eff−(x) ¬p
)
.
We extend the functions pre, post , eff + and eff − to sets: pre(X) =∧
x∈X pre(x). We say that a dynamic theory T is coherent if and only if for
every a ∈ Act0 and E ⊆ Evt0, if pre({a} ∪E) is consistent then post({a} ∪E) is
consistent.
Example 1. Alice has a high-level action buy of buying a movie ticket and a
basic action of buying a ticket online buyWeb. There is an event deliver of the
website delivering the electronic ticket. Here is its coherent dynamic theory:
pre(buy) = ⊤ post(buy) = Ticket
pre(wait) = ⊤ post(wait) = ⊤
pre(buyWeb) = ⊤ post(buyWeb) = PaidWeb
pre(deliver) = PaidWeb ∧ ¬Delivered post(deliver) = Ticket ∧ Delivered
In the rest of the paper we suppose a fixed background dynamic theory T .
An agent’s database contains her (incomplete) beliefs about the facts and
about event occurrences together with her intentions. Occurrence of event e ∈
Evt0 at time point t ∈ N is noted (t, e). We also consider the agent’s beliefs
about non-occurrence of events. For that we define the set of event complements
Evt0 = {e¯ : e ∈ Evt0} and write (t, e¯) for non-occurrence of e at t. An intention
is a triple i = (t, α, d) ∈ N×Act×N with t < d. It represents that the agent
wants to perform α in the time interval [t, d]: it should start at or after t and
end before or at deadline d. We define end(t, α, d) = d. When α ∈ Act0 then i is
a basic intention.
Definition 2. A belief-intention database is a finite set
∆ ⊆ (N×LP) ∪ (N× Evt0) ∪ (N× Evt0) ∪ (N× Act× N).
For example, ∆A = {(0,buy, 3)} is a database describing Alice’s intention
to buy a movie ticket within the temporal interval [0, 3].
3 Semantics
The semantics of dynamic theories and belief-intention databases is in terms of
paths defining for each time point which propositional variables are true, which
basic events will occur, and which (single) basic action the agent will perform.
Definition 3. A path is a triple pi = 〈V,H,D〉 with V : N −→ 2P, H : N →
2Evt0 , and D : N→ Act0. It is a T -model iff T is coherent and for every t ∈ N:
V (t+1) =
(
V (t) \ eff −
(
H(t)∪{D(t)}
))
∪ eff +
(
H(t)∪{D(t)}
))
H(t) = {e ∈ Evt0 | V (t) |= pre(e)}
D(t) ∈ {a ∈ Act0 | V (t) |= pre(a)}
So in a T -model: (1) the state at t+1 is determined by the state at t and the
basic action and events occurring at t; (2) event e occurs iff pre(e) is true (the
environment is reactive); (3) basic action a occurs implies that pre(a) is true
(the agent is autonomous and may or may not perform executable actions).
Definition 4. A T -model pi = 〈V,H,D〉 satisfies intention i = (t, α, d), noted
pi T i, if there are t
′, d′ such that t≤t′<d′≤d, V (t′) |= pre(α), V (d′) |= post(α),
and α ∈ Act0 implies D(t
′) = α.
So pi satisfies (t, α, d) if α is executable at some point after t and can end
before the deadline at a point where the postcondition of α is true. Moreover,
when α is basic then it conforms to the ‘do’-function D of pi.
Definition 5. A T -model pi = 〈V,H,D〉 is a T -model of ∆, noted pi T ∆, if
– (t, ϕ) ∈ ∆ implies V (t) |= ϕ;
– (t, e) ∈ ∆ implies e ∈ H(t);
– (t, e) ∈ ∆ implies e ∈ H(t);
– i ∈ ∆ implies pi T i.
We say that ∆ is T -satisfiable if there exists a T -model of ∆. ∆ is a T -
consequence of ∆′, noted ∆′ |=T ∆, if every T -model of ∆
′ is also a T -model of
∆. We write ∆′ |=T i when ∆ is a singleton {i}.
Proposition 1. T -satisfiability and T -consequence are decidable, for every T .
4 Refining an Intention
A high-level intention cannot be executed directly by the agent: it can only
be refined into lower-level intentions, until basic intentions are produced. For
example, my high-level intention i to submit a paper to JELIA before its deadline
June 30 is refined into the intention i1 to register it on Easychair before June
30, the intention i2 to upload it as a PDF file, etc.
Refinement consists in adding new intentions to the database while staying
consistent. Intuitively, to refine an intention i means to add a minimal set of new
intentions J to the database which, together with other intentions but i, suffice
to entail i. Moreover, the deadlines of the refining intentions should be before
that of the refined intention.
Definition 6. Intention i is refinable to intention set J in ∆, noted ∆ |=T i⊳J ,
iff
1. there is no j ∈ J such that ∆ |=T j;
2. ∆ ∪ J has a T -model;
3. (∆ ∪ J) \ {i} |=T i;
4. (∆ ∪ J ′) \ {i} |=T i for every J
′ ⊂ J ;
5. end(j) ≤ end(i) for every j ∈ J .
For our running example we have ∆A |=T (0,buy, 3)⊳ {(0, buyWeb, 1)}.
Proposition 2. It is decidable whether ∆ |=T i⊳ J .
5 Refinement and Instrumentality
A higher-level intention and the lower-level intentions refining it should stand in
a means-end relation: the lower-level means contribute to the higher-level end.
This is also called the instrumentality relation [1,4,8,16].
Instrumentality cannot be defined from an action theory alone. First, the
time point of action execution matters. For example, let us take up our inten-
tion of attending JELIA in November. Suppose I also have to go to the con-
ference host city, Larnaca, in May, for some other reason. The postcondition of
that action—to be in Larnaca—entails one of the preconditions of the attending
JELIA action. However, my May intention does not contribute to my November
intention. So the former is not necessarily instrumental for the latter. Second,
the preconditions of the means are typically more demanding than the precon-
ditions of the end; similarly, the postconditions of the means are more detailed
than those of the end. For example, buying a movie ticket should a priori not
require an adequate amount of money because there are other ways to buy a
ticket, such as online with a credit card.
Formally, the instrumentality relation relates a refined high-level intention to
a set of lower-level intentions, given a background database.
Definition 7. Let ∆ be a T -satisfiable database. Let intention i ∈ ∆ and let
intention set J ⊆ ∆. Then J is instrumental for i in ∆, noted ∆ |=T J ⋗ i, iff
1. ∆ \ J |=T i;
2. (∆ \ J) ∪ {j} |=T i for every j ∈ J ;
3. end(j) ≤ end(i) for every j ∈ J .
When ∆ |=T J ⋗ i then J is a minimal set of intentions satisfying the coun-
terfactual “if J was not in ∆ then i would no longer be guaranteed by ∆” and all
intentions of J terminate before or together with i. Note that when ∆ |=T J ⋗ i
then J cannot be empty (because we require i ∈ J).
We now relate intention refinement and instrumentality: when ∆ |=T i ⊳ J
then every element of J is instrumental for i in the refined database ∆ ∪ J .
Theorem 1. If ∆ |=T i⊳ J then ∆ ∪ J |=T {i, j}⋗ i for every j ∈ J .
The converse does not hold: instrumentality cannot guarantee that the added
intentions are new, so item 1 of Definition 6 does not necessarily hold.
6 Conclusion
We have extended Shoham’s database view by temporally extended high-level
intentions and STRIPS-like reactive environment events. The successive refine-
ment of high-level intentions into lower-level intentions relies on the consequence
relation of our semantics. The refined databases contain high- and low-level
intentions that are related by the instrumentality relation. We have shown that
satisfiability and consequence checking are still decidable in our extended data-
base perspective.
The closest domain concerning intention refinement would be Hierarchical
Task Networks (HTN) [9] which considering refinement of actions in a prede-
fined and primitive way. With an HTN planner, a BDI agent system has been
developed [7,17]. In this paper we focus on refinement which is, in some way, a
well-founded belief-intention database expansion. More general expansion may
lead to unsatisfiable database and raises issues about withdrawal or revision of
intentions. This is further explored in [13].
The next step is to investigate the revision of belief-intention databases. This
is typically required when the agent learns a new piece of information about the
environment. For example, suppose (t, e) ∈ ∆ and the agent learns that e will
not happen at t. This requires not only to contract other beliefs about facts
and events, but also some of the agent’s intentions. The instrumentality relation
is of fundamental importance here: when ∆ |=T J ⋗ i then the end intention
i is deeper entrenched in the belief-intention database ∆ than the means J to
achieve i. So the agent should only abandon i once all possible ways of refining i
have turned out to be unavailable. One possible relational postulate for revision
is that the end intentions in the revised database should be a subset of the
end intentions of the original database. There is currently little work on linking
intention revision with instrumentality, with the exception of [11,19]. However,
these contributions are still preliminary as many issues are not yet solved, such
as the frame problem or the relation between basic and non-basic actions. We
intend to explore in future work the revision of a belief-intention database where
rational change relies on instrumentality.
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